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 I. Introduction: A Bridge or a Wall ? 
 Th e relationship between international law and EU law has long beguiled scholars. 
Th e literature on their interplay is copious. 1 And there is no scarcity of titles deal-
ing with the notion of autonomy as applied to the relationship between the two. 2 
Ever since  Van Gend  & Loos , 3 the processes of reception, compliance and contesta-
tion between the EU and international legal orders have attracted attention, with 
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eff orts being made to explicate the links and fi ssures concerning them. 4 Authors 
have acknowledged the limits of dichotomous accounts  – relying on concepts such 
as  ‘ monism ’ and  ‘ dualism ’, from the international/domestic discourse  – focusing 
instead on the asymmetric and constantly adjusting nature of the relationship. 5 
 However, the starting point remains questioned. On one hand, interna-
tional lawyers tend to assume the  V ö lkerrechtsfreundlichkeit of the EU system, 6 
considering the nature of the Union as a Treaty-based organisation with deriva-
tive legal personality, 7 limited conferred competences 8 and a pre-determined 
institutional set-up. 9 Th e fact that it remains subject to the ultimate will of the 
Member States  – which retain an untouched core of sovereignty, including the 
powers to amend the Treaties and quit the organisation  – is also of note. 10 On 
that basis, they take EU law as particular ( lex specialis ) international law; as a 
sub-system embedded within the system (of  leges generales ). 11 On the other 
hand, EU  lawyers emphasise the distinctive,  sui generis nature of the integra-
tion project and its supranational legal regime, focusing on its high degree of 
constitutional development, institutional maturity and the density of the exist-
ing  acquis . 12 
 Whatever the perspective, the Treaties are not explicit in this regard. 13 Th ey 
say little about the place and ranking of international norms within the EU 
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legal order and fail to determine their eff ects and functions in particular situa-
tions, whether as gap fi llers, validity measures, or interpretative guidelines. In the 
absence of specifi c provisions, the systematisation of the relationship has fallen to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which has articulated it  ad hoc 
and in piecemeal fashion. 
 Th e case law is unsystematic, according power and signifi cance depend-
ing on the type of instrument and the function it may perform in the specifi c 
 circumstances. 14 Whilst the Court has reiterated its commitment to international 
law, retaining that the EU  ‘ must respect [it] in the exercise of its powers ’, 15 and 
holding that provisions in agreements concluded by the organisation  ‘ form an 
integral part of [the Union ’ s] law ’, 16 this recognition has led to varying strate-
gies, ranging from unswerving compliance with international norms to blatant 
 instrumentalisation. 17 But the fact that international rules be binding and have 
a place within the EU system does not automatically imply that they be self-
executing. Generally, the reasoning has been outcome-driven, oscillating between 
openness and closeness of the regime, 18 following a consequentialist approach to 
advance the EU cause  – and preserve the Court ’ s prerogatives. 19 
 With this in mind, the Court has distinguished several degrees of intensity in 
the eff ects of international law, diff erentiating several methods of incorporation, 
each of them subject to diff erent conditions  – depending on whether international 
law is perceived to promote or impede EU powers. Ziegler has discerned, at least, 
three distinct mechanisms: direct eff ect; indirect eff ect or conform interpretation; 
and  ‘ substantive borrowing ’. 20 However, the gate-keeping criteria have fl uctuated 
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over time  – with the Court holding the key to the door  – from an  a priori predis-
position to the absorption of international norms, to a hostile exclusionism to 
guarantee the  ‘ autonomy ’ of EU law. 
 And  ‘ autonomy ’, as the remainder of this chapter will show, is not a static 
notion. 21 It is an elusive concept that has travelled an intricate journey through 
several meanings and implications. 22 It was fi rst used to describe the distinctive-
ness of EU law, as the  consequence of integration, to subsequently become the 
normative  cause (or raison d ’ ê tre) of the European project. Autonomy has trans-
formed from being a key tool to denote  ‘ the specifi c characteristics of the EU and 
EU law ’, 23 to implying the (normative aspiration of) closeness and self-suffi  ciency 
of the regime in its entirety. It has gone from being a (privileged)  means securing 
the (formal) emancipation of EU law from its international roots, to becoming a 
(rootless)  end in itself, detached from any identifi able value base  – whether in the 
Rule of Law or in fundamental rights  – despite Article 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU). 
 It will be argued that in the post Opinion 2/13 isolationist era, 24 a point of 
 axiological vacuum has been reached, in which  ‘ autonomy ’  per se has become 
a (new, if not  the ultimate) value of the EU legal order. Th e objectivisation of 
 ‘ autonomy ’ (and its veneration) means not only that EU law has been (substan-
tively) detached from international law (and its principles), but also that the system 
as a whole has been emptied of the values on which  ‘ the Union is founded ’, 25 posing 
grave problems of legitimacy and self-justifi cation. 26 Th is chapter will, therefore, 
contest the nature of autonomy as a principle and challenge its axiological eman-
cipation as being contrary to the Rule of (EU) Law. 
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 II. Chronicle of Autonomy ’ s Phases: 
From Distinctiveness to (Strategic) Isolation 
 Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, mixed agreements are said to be 
 ‘ binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States ’. 27 And it is 
also an explicit objective of the Union to  ‘ uphold and promote ’ its values in its rela-
tions with the wider world, thereby contributing not only to  ‘ the strict observance ’, 
but also to  ‘ the development of international law ’. 28 Th e EU, therefore, accord-
ing to the very wording of Article 3(5) TEU, should emerge not only as a passive 
recipient, but also as an active shaper  and guarantor of international norms. 29 
Th e relationship between the two regimes has, however, been put under constant 
strain, both pre- and post-Lisbon, mediated by the fl uidity of  ‘ autonomy ’. Th e next 
sub-sections will show how, progressive tightness in the case law of the CJEU 
has, paradoxically, developed in the wake of the more international law-friendly 
language introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, tracking the evolution of  ‘ autonomy ’ 
and the diff erent roles it has played through the ages of European integration, 
from a quasi-empirical descriptor to a full normative notion, hailed as a sort of 
meta-principle of EU law in its latest incarnation. 
 A. Th e Early Days of the  ‘ New Legal Order ’ : 
Autonomy as Descriptor ? 
 At the time of the Union ’ s inception, as the European Coal and Steel Community 
in 1952 and the European Economic Community in 1957 respectively, the inex-
tricable bond between the EU and international law went uncontested. Because 
this new legal construct had been established by sovereign States (as  ‘ masters of 
the Treaties ’ ) via international agreements, there was no doubt that the Commu-
nities were creatures of international law, embedded in the general regime. 30 
Yet, the supervening times saw crucial developments, which raised questions 
regarding the EU ’ s legal nature. Th e CJEU pursued an ever-deepening integration 
by pronouncing EU law supreme, 31 and having direct eff ect within the Member 
States ’ legal systems under certain conditions, 32 also elevating the Treaties as 
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 ‘ the basic constitutional charter ’ of the Union. 33 Consequently, the EU became an 
entity, which no longer was a  ‘ pure ’ international organisation, but an increasingly 
 ‘ constitutionalised ’ legal order. 34 
 Whilst the CJEU pursued an integrating approach towards Member State law, 
it concurrently sought to diff erentiate EU law from its external basis in public 
international law. Although the Court still considered the then-Community a 
 ‘ new legal order  of international law ’ in  Van Gend en Loos , 35 it soon dropped the 
 ‘ international law ’ qualifi er, determining instead that,  ‘ [b]y contrast with ordi-
nary international treaties , the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system … ’. 36 
Autonomy in this context  – which was not referred to in that way until 
the 1990s 37   – served to denote the distinctiveness of EU law, as an empirical as 
well as legal reality, describing how the EU, as a separate, special and  ‘ autono-
mous ’ regime, pursued  ‘ its own particular objectives ’. 38 Th e stance at that point 
appeared to refl ect the  ‘ certain autonomy ’ predicated by the International Court 
of Justice of ( all ) international organisations, as independent subjects of inter-
national law. 39 
 Normative consequences also follow from such characterisation  –  arguably, 
as would also occur with other instruments of international law. 40 Th e CJEU 
indeed subsequently held that (other) international agreements cannot aff ect 
the autonomy of Union law, 41 that  ‘ the validity of any [Union] measure  … 
must be considered to be the expression  … of a constitutional guarantee stem-
ming from the [EU] Treaty as an autonomous legal system ’, 42 and that treaties 
concluded by the Union must not alter the functional nature and competences of 
its organs, including those of the Court of Justice. 43 Autonomy thus emerged as an 
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  47  Case 106/77  Simmenthal [ 1978 ]  ECR 629 . 
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the Infl uence of International Organizations  – An Introduction ’ in  RA  Wessel and  S  Blockmans (eds), 
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 operational-constitutional factor, characterising the independent functioning of 
the EU as per the founding Treaties. 44 Functionalism explained autonomy (at least 
in part), capturing the political, institutional and policy-making self-standingness 
of the EU as an international organisation in relation to both its Member States 
and other international actors. 45 
 But the Court went a step further. By separating EU law from the rest of inter-
national law, it privileged the application of Union law within the legal systems of 
the Member States,  in lieu of general international law, thereby consolidating its 
supremacy. Th e separation was tactical. Th e consequence for Member States was 
that they could no longer oppose or nullify the eff ectiveness of EU law through the 
invocation of domestic rules on the incorporation of  ‘ classic ’ international law. Th e 
Court appropriated the instruments of its creation and  ‘ liberated ’ the Union from 
such contingencies. It moved the source of its validation from international law to 
its own legal order and transformed the Treaties into the  Grundgesetz of the EU ’ s 
constitution. 46 Autonomy in this framework played a primarily  ‘ internal ’ role; the 
emancipation of EU law from international law was an instrument to claim the 
direct penetration of EU rules within the domestic systems of the Member States. 
Th ere was no  a priori animosity vis- à -vis international law implicit in the term. 
Th e description of EU law  – and the normative re-confi guration that ensued  – as 
an autonomous form (of international law) served the purpose of a constitutional 
(and hierarchical)  ‘ fusion ’ with Member State law. 47 
 B. Th e External Facet of Autonomy: Towards  Kadi Dualism 
 While the EU  ‘ withdrew ’ from its international legal sources and was gradually 
 ‘ autonomised ’, in the earlier days of integration it still displayed a  ‘ monist ’ open-
ness towards the international legal order. It allowed binding international norms 
to become  ipso facto and without further transposition part of the Union legal 
regime, whether they took the form of international agreements, 48 concluded by 
its own institutions, 49 or of customary law  – including principles from the law 
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of treaties, 50 nationality awards, 51 norms governing the obligation of States to 
allow access to their territory by their own nationals, 52 the immunities applicable 
to heads of State, 53 and the extent of jurisdictional powers, 54 which were quasi-
automatically absorbed. 55 
 Even regarding a treaty the EU was not a party to, but to which all its Member 
States had acceded, such as the 1947 General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade 
(GATT), did the Court consider the Union to be bound by virtue of the doctrine 
of  ‘ functional succession ’. 56 Th e GATT had been adopted before the Communi-
ties came into existence. And, in  International Fruit , 57 the Court considered the 
Union subject to the agreement to the extent that it had assumed powers previ-
ously exercised by the Member States in the specifi c areas it regulated. Yet, it soon 
became clear that this did not amount to accepting that EU measures could be 
challenged, without more, on grounds of incompatibility with GATT norms. Simi-
larly to the test for direct eff ect of EU law, the provisions at stake needed also to 
be capable of conferring rights, for which reason  ‘ regard must be simultaneously 
paid to the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of the [treaty] and of the 
provisions concerned ’. 58 On account of  ‘ the great fl exibility of its provisions ’, the 
GATT, however, was considered not to meet the mark, so it could not be invoked 
to challenge the lawfulness of Union law. 59 Th e same applied to WTO provisions 
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challenged for incompatibility with GATT rules, where the EU measure concerned referred expressly 
to specifi c GATT provisions, or where the EU intended to implement a precise GATT obligation. See 
Case 70/87  Fediol EU:C:1989:254; and Case C-69/89  Nakajima EU:C:1991:186. Yet, there has not been 
any application of the  Fediol and  Nakajima doctrines, with the  Petrotub ruling being the only exception. 
See Case C-76/00 P  Petrotub EU:C:2003:4  cf M é ndez (n 55), positing the decision is rather an example 
of  ‘ a particular species of consistent interpretation ’ rather than a direct application of the  Nakajima test. 
  60  Case C-149/96  Portugal v Council [ 1999 ]  ECR I-08395 ; and  Case C-377/02  Van Parys [ 2005 ] 
 ECR I-01465 . For commentary, see  S  Griller ,  ‘ Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European 
Union :  Annotation to case C-149/96 Portugal v. Council ’ ( 2000 )  3  Journal of International Economic 
Law  441 ; and  J  Jackson ,  ‘ International Law Status of WTO DS Reports :  Obligation to Comply or 
Option to  “ Buy-Out ” ? ’ ( 2004 )  98  American Journal of International Law  109 . 
  61  P  Eeckhout ,  ‘ Th e Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement :  Interconnecting Legal Systems ’ 
( 1997 )  34  Common Market Law Review  11, 28 – 29 . See also  G  de B ú rca ,  ‘ Th e European Court of Justice 
and the International Legal Order aft er Kadi ’ ( 2010 )  52  Harvard International Law Journal  1, 44 ff  ; and 
M é ndez (n 55). 
  62  Case C-308/06  Intertanko [ 2008 ]  ECR I-405 7 paras 49 – 50. See also International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1340  UNTS 61 and 1341  UNTS 3 ( ‘ MARPOL Convention ’ ); and 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833  UNTS 3 ( ‘ UNCLOS ’ ). For a critique, see Eeckhout (n 1) 
398 – 400. 
  63  On the evolution of the Court ’ s approach, see  M  M é ndez ,  Th e Legal Eff ects of EU Agreements 
( Oxford University Press ,  2013 ) and  C  Hillion and  P  Koutrakos (eds),  Mixed Agreements Revisited 
( Hart Publishing ,  2010 ) . 
  64  cf the more relaxed approach in  Biotech and  IATA , where the Court seems to do away with a rights-
based analysis to establish the invocability of international treaty provisions for validity review of EU 
law. Case C-377/98  Netherlands v Parliament and Council ( Biotech ) EU:C:2001:523; and Case C-344/04 
 IATA EU:C:2006:10. See also Case C-213/03  P ê cheurs de l ’ é tang de Berre [2004] ECR I-07357. 
and decisions of its dispute settlement body, once the GATT was replaced by 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO)  – even if the Union itself acceded to the 
treaty. 60 Th is position was hence taken as a break from the Court ’ s previously 
predominantly  ‘ monist ’ perspective. 61 
 Subsequent cases confi rmed the rupture.  Intertanko restrained the criteria 
for direct eff ect of international agreements, refusing the review of legality of a 
Directive which practically incorporated an  – albeit for the EU not formally 
binding  – international convention (MARPOL) into EU law, on the basis that 
there had not been  ‘ functional succession ’ entailing a full transfer of powers 
from the Member States in the areas at stake. 62 It also denied the relevance of the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)  – which the EU had ratifi ed  – 
invoking the  ‘ nature and structure ’ as well as the  ‘ broad logic ’ of the treaty. Hitherto, 
EU courts had only precluded reliance on such grounds solely with regard to the 
GATT/WTO  Agreement. 63 Otherwise, where the relevant provision(s) were suffi  -
ciently clear, precise and unconditional  – mirroring the criteria for direct eff ect of 
internal EU rules   – international treaties concluded by the Union were deemed 
fi t for purpose. 64 Yet, UNCLOS was said not to confer rights on individuals, but 
rather on vessels via their fl ag State. And that prevented its use for validity review. 
Th e Court painted a picture of a pure inter-state agreement, disconnected from the 
rights that individuals (more or less directly) derived therefrom. 
 Th e  ATAA case then made the annulment of EU legislation on the basis of inter-
national customary law nearly impossible  – at least for non-privileged  applicants. 
54 Violeta Moreno-Lax
  65  ATAA (n 54) para 107 (emphasis added). 
  66  ATAA (n 54) para 110 (emphasis added). Th e ruling has also been criticised for further limiting 
the scope of the  ‘ functional succession ’ doctrine. See eg J Wouters, J Odermatt, and T Ramopoulos, 
 ‘ Worlds Apart ? Comparing the Approaches of the European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature to 
International Law ’ in Cremona and Th ies (n 19) 249. 
  67  Kadi I (n 42). 
  68  Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P  Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi ( ‘ Kadi II ’ ) ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. 
  69  Kadi I (n 42) para 317. 
  70  cf Eeckhout (n 1) 420 – 21. 
  71  F Casolari,  ‘ Giving Indirect Eff ect to International Law within the EU Legal Order: Th e Doctrine 
of Consistent Interpretation ’ in Cannizzaro, Palchetti and Wessel (n 1) 395. 
  72  A Skordas,  ‘ V ö lkerrechtsfreundlichkeit as Comity and the Disquiet of Neoformalism: A Response to 
Jan Klabbers ’ in Koutrakos (n 6) 126. 
  73  G  de B ú rca ,  ‘ Th e ECJ and the International Legal Order :  A Re-Evaluation ’ in  G  de B ú rca and 
 JHH   Weiler (eds),  Th e Worlds of European Constitutionalism ( Cambridge University Press ,  2012 )  108 . 
  74  Kadi I (n 42) para 303. 
Th ereaft er, the conditions for individuals to fulfi l require that  ‘ fi rst,  those  principles 
[of customary law] are capable of calling into question the competence of the 
 European Union to adopt that act ’, beside that  ‘ the act in question is liable to aff ect 
rights which the individual derives from European Union law  … ’. 65 Th e scope of 
review was, in addition, limited to establishing any  ‘ manifest errors of assessment 
concerning the conditions for applying those principles ’, 66 which further reduced 
any chances of success. 
 Th e  Kadi saga, where the CJEU annulled a Regulation implementing a United 
Nations Security Council Resolution, because of its infringement of funda-
mental rights ( Kadi I ) 67  – a stance the Court confi rmed, despite considerable, 
yet still insuffi  cient, developments for the protection of due process guarantees 
at the UN level ( Kadi II ) 68  – consolidated the trend. Th e Court adopted a stark 
 ‘ dualist ’ stance; not only vis- à -vis customary or conventional international law of 
a particular kind, whether directly eff ective or not, but on a more general basis, 
proclaiming the Union an  ‘ internal and autonomous legal order ’. 69 Th e move 
allowed Luxembourg to set aside international norms as irrelevant, to focus on 
the constitutionality assessment of the  EU  measure at hand as per the standards 
of  EU law  – others have praised the stance as one challenging the adequacy of the 
UN terrorist listing system; they consider that the upholds  international human 
rights standards and contributes to their consolidation as universal values, 70 but 
even in this light such upholds is achieved through the medium of  EU fundamen-
tal rights, ie by fi rst  ‘ Europeanising ’ international human rights. 
 Th ese judgments show the CJEU ’ s growing reluctance to ensuring compliance 
with international law as such, 71 from building bridges to raising a  ‘ dualist ’ wall 
with international law, 72 in a bid to safeguard the Union ’ s autonomy. 73 Autonomy, 
however, takes on a new meaning in this phase, based on pragmatic and teleologi-
cal arguments on the proper functioning of the EU and the achievement of Treaty 
goals. Th e Court provides it with a normative anchor in fundamental constitu-
tional tenets:  ‘ the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights ’, 
which allow no departure therefrom under any circumstances. 74 Autonomy is thus 
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  75  Rather than the  cause  – in diametrical opposition to Opinion 2/13 (see next section below). 
  76  Kadi II (n 68) para 66. 
  77  Kadi I (n 42) para 303; see also paras 283 ff , 326 and 330. 
  78  Kadi I (n 42) para 285. 
  79  For a similar approach, shielding the more protective EU asylum rules from the infl uence of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) in situations regarding  ‘ war refugees ’, see Case C-285/12 
 Diakit é ECLI:EU:C:2014:39, drawing on Case C-465/07  Elgafaji [2009] ECR I-921. For analysis, 
see  V    Moreno-Lax ,  ‘ Systematising Systemic Integration:  “ War Refugees ” , Regime Relations and a 
Proposal for a Cumulative Approach to International Commitments ’ ( 2014 )  12  Journal of International 
 Criminal Justice  907 ; and  V  Moreno-Lax ,  ‘ Of Autonomy, Autarky, Purposiveness and Fragmentation : 
 Th e Relationship between EU Asylum Law and International Humanitarian Law ’ in  JF  Durieux and 
 D  Cantor (eds),  Refuge from Inhumanity ( Brill ,  2014 )  295 . 
  80  Kadi I (n 42) para 303. 
  81  Art 6(1) TEU. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/02 ( ‘ CFR ’ ). 
presented as the  consequence of the (substantive) hierarchy of norms within the 
EU legal order; 75 it constitutes a (formal or procedural)  ‘ means to an end ’ for the 
preservation of the (substantive) integrity of the most basic values of the system. 
In fact,  Kadi II omits any reference to autonomy per se, deploying its  ‘ dualist ’ logic 
exclusively from the perspective of the constitutional superiority of fundamental 
rights. 76 
 Autonomy in the  Kadi jurisprudence is preoccupied with the axiological  ‘ foun-
dation of the Union ’, 77 from where the legitimacy of the order derives. It constitutes 
its vehicle and not (yet) an end in itself. Autonomy serves to introduce the notion 
of a hierarchy  within EU primary law, justifying limits to the possibility of accord-
ing priority to (confl icting) international law as a result, so that  ‘ … obligations 
imposed by an international agreement cannot have the eff ect of prejudicing the 
constitutional principles of the [EU] Treaty, which include the principle that all 
[EU] acts must respect fundamental rights  … ’. 78  Kadi thus installs a sort of  ‘ princi-
pled dualism ’ grounded in a special breed of  ‘ super-primary ’ constitutional norms 
conveying the values of the organisation. 79 As a result, while market freedoms 
( qua  ‘ ordinary ’ primary law) may exceptionality be derogated from in accordance 
with today ’ s Article 351 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU),  ‘ any derogation from  … Article [2 TEU values] ’ is strictly forbidden. 80 
No (extraneous) source of (international) law  – be it the UN Charter or imperative 
Security Council Resolutions  – can force an interpretation of EU law in contraven-
tion of fundamental rights. 
 Yet, as the next section reveals, the journey of autonomy did not terminate 
here. Th ere is a further shift , from form to substance, which emptied the notion of 
its normative justifi cation. 
 C. Opinion 2/13: Th e Autonomisation of Autonomy 
 Th e Charter of Fundamental Rights  – which aft er Lisbon produces legally binding 
eff ects 81  – can be taken to give expression to the founding values of the organi-
sation mentioned in  Kadi , translating in concrete terms the generic allusion to 
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  82  Recital 5, Preamble CFR. 
  83  Recital 4, Preamble CFR (emphasis added). 
  84  For a detailed review, see  S  Iglesias S á nchez ,  ‘ Th e Court and the Charter ’ ( 2012 )  49  Common 
Market Law Review  1565 . 
  85  European Convention on Human Rights [1950]  ETS 5 ( ‘ ECHR ’ ). 
  86  Opinion of AG Cruz Villal ó n, Case C-70/10  Scarlet ECLI:EU:C:2011:255, delivered on 14 April 
2011, para 30. For a critique of this approach, see  G  de B ú rca ,  ‘Aft er the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights :  Th e Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator ? ’ ( 2013 )  20  Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law  168 . 
  87  Th is includes the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine [1997]  ETS 164, as 
part of the normative grounding of Art 3 CFR, on the right to the integrity of the person; the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( ‘ ICCPR ’ ) [1969] 999  UNTS 171, regarding Art 19 CFR, 
on the protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition, and Art 49 CFR, concerning the 
principles of legality and proportionality of criminal off ences and penalties; and the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, [1989] 1577  UNTS 3, within the remit of Art 24 CFR, on the 
rights of the child. See Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/02, 
18, 24, 25 and 30. Recall that, according to Art 52(7) CFR, the explanations provide  ‘ guidance in the 
interpretation of this Charter ’ and thus  ‘ shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the 
Member States ’ (emphasis added). 
  88  See, eg, Art 18 CFR explicitly referring to the Convention on the Status of Refugees ( ‘ Geneva 
Convention ’ ) [1951] 189  UNTS 150. 
  89  According to Art 52(3) CFR, in particular,  ‘ [i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which corre-
spond to rights guaranteed by the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by 
the said Convention ’ (emphasis added). 
  90  cf Case C-64/16  Associa ç ã o Sindical dos Ju í zes Portugueses ECLI:EU:C:2018:117 para 29 ff . 
  91  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 174. 
  92  Art 19(1) TEU:  ‘ Th e Court of Justice  … shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaties the law is observed ’. 
 ‘ human rights and fundamental freedoms ’ enclosed in Article 2 TEU. It actu-
ally  ‘ reaffi  rms ’ and is, therefore, based on the shared constitutional traditions of 
the Member States and their  common international obligations. 82 Its fi nal goal is 
to  strengthen the protection of human rights  –  ‘ Europeanised ’ qua  fundamental 
rights  – within the EU legal order. 83 
 Post Lisbon, the Charter has become the primary reference point in cases 
involving fundamental rights disputes. 84 When the rights and freedoms recog-
nised in the Charter are at stake, the instrument provides the reference framework 
for analysis, so that recourse to external sources (such as the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR) 85 ) is no longer the priority. 86 However, the Charter 
is not self-suffi  cient. It is  by design embedded in international human rights law, 
from which it borrows substance and legitimacy. Th is is clear from the multi-
ple references to other instruments in the Charter Explanations, 87 from the text 
of certain clauses, 88 from the way in which the horizontal provisions have been 
 articulated, 89 and from its relationship to general principles. 90 
 In Opinion 2/13, the Court, nonetheless, failed to acknowledge the organic 
interlocking of international human rights law and EU fundamental rights. 
Despite the structural permeability of EU law being constitutionally scheduled 
in Articles 6 TEU and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (CFR), the CJEU omitted its recognition as one of the  ‘ specifi c character-
istics of the EU and EU law ’ 91  – by which the Court itself is presumably bound. 92 
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  93  Ziegler speaks of  ‘ aggressive formalistic constitutionalism ’ to characterise the stance. See 
 KS   Ziegler ,  ‘ Beyond Pluralism and Autonomy :  Systematic Harmonization as a Paradigm for the Inter-
action of EU Law and International Law ’ ( 2016 )  35  Yearbook of European Law  667, 668 .  cf  P  Eeckhout , 
 ‘ Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue :  Autonomy or Autarky ? ’ ( 2015 )  38 
 Fordham International Law Journal  955, 989 and 991 – 92 , presenting it rather as a form of  ‘ radical legal 
pluralism ’. 
  94  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 167. 
  95  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 172. 
  96  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 168. 
  97  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) paras 169 – 70 and 177. 
  98  Th e pro-autonomy interpretation it seems to imply constitutes the EU equivalent of the much 
criticised  in dubio mitius approach under international law, maximising State sovereignty over the 
eff ectiveness of contracted obligations. For a critique, see  Lauterpacht ,  ‘ Restrictive Interpretation and 
Eff ectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties ’ ( 1949 )  26  British Yearbook of International Law  48 . See 
also  A  Orakhelashvili ,  Th e Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law ( Oxford Univer-
sity Press ,  2008 )  414 . 
Instead, the Court invoked and distorted the role of  ‘ autonomy ’, tipping the 
balance towards its most exclusionary form. 93 Although independence does not 
require autarky and isolation, this was perceived as the only way to discard the 
compatibility of the Draft  Accession Agreement to the ECHR with EU law and 
maintain its exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it. 
 Accession was not to aff ect the Union ’ s competences, nor was it to alter the 
constitutional architecture and especial features of EU law. Among these, the 
Court mentioned the  ‘ structured network of principles, rules and mutually inter-
dependent relations [engaging] the EU and its Member States  … in a  “ process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe ” ’. 94 Th e integration 
project was considered  ‘ the  raison d ’ ê tre of the EU itself  ’ ; 95 its ultimate aim. Th e 
legal structure supporting that process of integration was, in turn, said to be  ‘ based 
on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all other Member 
States  … a set of common values on which the EU is founded ’ which  ‘ implies and 
justifi es the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values 
will be recognised and  … that the law of the EU that implements them will be 
respected ’. 96 
 Fundamental rights do belong in that  ‘ set of common values ’, but unlike the 
preeminent place accorded to them in  Kadi , in Opinion 2/13 the Court sees them 
as subordinate to  ‘ the structure and objectives of the EU ’ ; they must be  ‘ interpreted 
and applied within the EU in accordance with [its] constitutional framework ’. 97 
So, fundamental rights appear to descend from their super-primary law position 
to a plain ordinary-primary law rank. Rather than providing the EU regime with 
its underpinning axiological basis, providing substantive, value justifi cation to the 
structure and objectives of the EU, there seems to be an evolution of fundamental 
rights becoming a sub-set of rules that remains constrained by the constitutional 
dynamics (and inertia) of the system. 98 
 And the Court notes that within this set-up, the (newly found)  ‘ principle ’ 
of mutual trust  ‘ is of fundamental importance in EU law ’. Th e Court ties in 
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  99  Th is was seen to a lesser extent in Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10  NS  & ME 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:865; and in Case C-399/11  Melloni ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, where the Court balances 
both. For an appraisal, see  Spreeuw ,  ‘ Do As I Say, Not As I Do :  Th e Application of Mutual Recognition 
and Mutual Trust ’ ( 2012 )  8  Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies  505 . 
  100  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) paras 191 – 92 (emphasis added).  cf Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU 
 Aranyosi and C ă ld ă raru ECLI:EU:C:2016:198 paras 90 – 98, tempering the approach in the context of 
the European Arrest Warrant and requiring that there be an assessment in the specifi c case, stating, 
nonetheless, that  ‘ a fi nding that there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment by virtue of 
general conditions of detention in the issuing Member State cannot lead, in itself, to the refusal to 
execute a European arrest warrant ’ (para 91). In such situation,  ‘ the execution of that warrant must be 
postponed but it cannot be abandoned ’ (para 98). 
  101  ECtHR,  Tarakhel v Switzerland , Application No 29217/12, 4 November 2014, paras 92 – 93. See also 
ECtHR,  MSS v Belgium and Greece , Application No 30696/09, 21 January 2011. 
  102  Associa ç ã o Sindical dos Ju í zes Portugueses (n 90) para 35 (emphasis added). See also C-279/09  DEB 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:811 paras 29 – 33 (post-Lisbon); and C-432/05  Unibet ECLI:EU:C:2007:163 para 37 
(pre-Lisbon). 
  103  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 194 (emphasis added). 
 fundamental rights to compliance with that principle 99  – instead of the other way 
round  – stating that it  ‘ requires ’ Member States  ‘ save in exceptional circumstances, 
to consider all the other Member States to be complying  … with the fundamental 
rights recognised by EU law ’  – regardless of whether this is the case in practice or 
not. Indeed, the Court insists that,  ‘ when implementing EU law, the Member States 
may  … be required to  presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the 
other Member States, so that  … they may not check whether that other Member 
State has actually,  in a specifi c case , observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the EU ’ 100  – the compatibility of this reading with the principle of eff ective judicial 
protection gone unheeded. 
 Th is frontally contradicts fi ndings by the Strasbourg Court in  MSS and 
 Tarakhel , 101 where the Strasbourg Court found that an eff ective remedy requires 
scrutiny of compliance with human rights protection by the receiving State 
 before a person can be transferred or deported there, regardless of whether that 
State is a Party to the ECHR or, even, a Member State of the EU. Th e stance also 
disputes the key principle of eff ective judicial protection of individuals ’ rights 
under EU law,  ‘ referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU [and] 
stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States  … 
 enshrined in  Articles 6 and 13 [ECHR] , and which is  now reaffi  rmed by Article 47 
of the Charter ’. 102 
 Th e Luxembourg judges do acknowledge the confl ict of this interpretation 
with ECHR standards. But they consider those (apparently higher) ECHR stand-
ards to be problematic, stating that 
 in so far as the ECHR would  … require a Member State to check that another Member 
State has observed fundamental rights,  even though EU law imposes an obligation of 
mutual trust between those Member States , accession is liable to upset the underlying 
balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law. 103 
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  104  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) paras 193 and 212 (emphasis added). 
  105  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 170. 
  106  cf Eeckhout (n 93) 977, suggesting that disconnection clauses may be acceptable in certain policy 
domains, but it being inappropriate as a wholesale approach to the entirety of EU law. 
  107  cf International Court of Justice (ICJ),  Jurisdictional immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: 
Greece Intervening) , Application by Germany of 23 December 2008, para 6:  ‘ Outside the specifi c frame-
work [of the EU Treaties]  … the [Member States] continue to live with one another under the regime 
of general international law ’. 
  108  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 180. 
  109  Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88  Hoechst [ 1989 ]  ECR 2852 para 13. 
  110  Eeckhout (n 93), 960 and 964. See also (n 89). 
  111  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 179 (emphasis added). 
  112  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 180 (emphasis added). 
 Yet, the issue is whether EU law may objectively impose an obligation of mutual 
trust that discounts fundamental rights, making them ineff ective (and even 
un-invocable) in the particular case. 
 Autonomy here seems to be re-conceptualised by the Court as unhindered 
self-rule, when considering that 
 the Member States have, by reason of their membership of the EU, accepted that rela-
tions between them as regards the matters covered by the transfer of powers  … to the 
EU are governed by EU law  to the exclusion, if EU law so requires, of any other law . 104 
 Th e  ‘ autonomy ’ of the EU legal order is, hence, asserted both  ‘ in relation to the 
laws of the Member States and in relation to international law ’, including the 
ECHR. 105 But can EU law disconnect Member States  inter se relations from inter-
national law en bloc, 106 in such a categorical and unqualifi ed a way  – without even 
reserving international rules a subsidiary role to play as mere fallback regime ? 107 
 In this particular instance, isolation requires the revisiting of the relationship 
between the Charter and the ECHR fi rst. Not only is the Charter taken as the 
primary source of human rights within the EU legal order, but the ECHR appears 
relegated to the position of  ‘ any other international agreement ’. 108 Th e Court 
acknowledges that  ‘ fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR, constitute 
general principles of the EU ’ s law ’, but its  ‘ particular signifi cance ’, recognised in past 
jurisprudence, 109 is no longer mentioned in this context. Nor is the fact that the 
Charter and the Treaties, albeit not formally, eff ectively incorporate the substance 
of the Convention into EU law  – via Article 6 TEU and Article 52(3) CFR. 110 On 
the contrary, the Court underlines that  ‘ as the EU has not acceded to the ECHR, 
the latter does  not constitute a legal instrument which has been formally incor-
porated into the legal order of the EU ’. 111 Th e Court distances itself further from 
the ECHR, by suggesting that it would only be  aft er accession that the ECHR,  ‘ like 
any other international agreement concluded by the EU ’, would  ‘ form an integral 
part of EU law ’, citing the  ATAA case to support the claim. 112 Curiously, the CJEU 
omits any reference to Article 52(3) of the Charter to articulate the relationship 
between it and the ECHR. It appeals instead to Article 53, but re-draft ing its text, 
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  113  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 187 (emphasis added). 
  114  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 189.  cf Melloni (n 99). 
  115  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 174. 
  116  Editorial ,  ‘ Th e EU ’ s Accession to the ECHR  – a  “ NO ” from the ECJ! ’ ( 2015 )  52  Common Market 
Law Review  1, 11 . 
  117  Ziegler (n 22). 
  118  To the contrary, although the CJEU reiterates the crucial character of  ‘ mutual trust ’ as the back-
bone principle of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the truth is that, according to Art 67 TFEU, 
the establishment of the AFSJ  ‘ shall ’ (ie must) be undertaken  ‘ with respect for fundamental rights ’. 
Concurring: Eeckhout (n 93) 970; and  S  Peers ,  ‘ Th e EU ’ s Accession to the ECHR :  Th e Dream Becomes 
a Nightmare ’ ( 2015 )  16  German Law Journal  213 . In this regard, see also  S  Douglas-Scott ,  ‘ Th e EU ’ s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice :  A Lack of Fundamental Rights, Mutual Trust and Democracy ? ’ 
( 2008 – 2009 )  11  Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies  53 . 
 mentioning that  ‘ nothing therein is to be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
aff ecting fundamental rights as recognised, in their respective fi elds of application, 
by EU law and international law ’ and, then, inserting a mention to the eff ect of 
 ‘ including the ECHR ’. 113 
 Relying on that provision, the Court seems to over-write the  lex specialis in 
Article 52(3), which literally requires that, in case of matching rights, the ECHR 
provide the  ‘ leading standard ’, as a minimum fl oor of protection, with the Charter 
potentially  ‘ providing more extensive protection ’. Th e Court reverses the rela-
tionship between Charter/ECHR in the name of the autonomy of EU law. When 
assessing the eff ect of Article 53 ECHR, allowing Contracting Parties to main-
tain or introduce a higher level of human rights protection within their domestic 
system than the one provided for in ECHR provisions, the Luxembourg Court 
posits that that power, as regards Contracting Parties that are also Member 
States of the EU, should be  ‘ limited  … to that which is necessary to ensure that 
the level of protection provided for by the Charter ’, so that the  ‘ primacy, unity 
and eff ectiveness of EU law are not compromised ’. Sidelining Article 52(3) CFR, 
the coordination between the two instruments is purported to aff ect the reading 
of  ‘ the rights recognised by the Charter that correspond to those guaranteed by 
the ECHR ’. 114 
 What the Court ultimately achieves is the reversal of the means-ends rela-
tionship between fundamental rights and the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness 
of EU law. Autonomy, encapsulating  these  ‘ specifi c characteristics of the EU and 
EU  law ’, 115 is emptied from the normative foundation that fundamental rights, 
as per the  Kadi paradigm, could/should provide it with. In turn, fundamental 
rights are prevented from going too far, if that is perceived to impinge upon the 
primacy, unity and eff ectiveness (or  ‘ autonomy ’ for short) of EU law. Drawing on 
what has been called a  ‘ formalistic ’, 116  ‘ free-standing teleological interpretation ’, 117 
autonomy is ultimately  ‘ autonomised ’ by the Court to defend a (selective) set of 
 ‘ special characteristics ’ of EU law, without identifying any particular reason or 
its  justifi cation  – while  ‘ respect for human rights ’ is an explicit founding value of 
the Union, nowhere is  ‘ mutual trust ’ mentioned in the Treaties, let alone as core 
grounding of integration. 118 It becomes an abstract principle, fl exible enough to 
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  119  Assessing autonomy as a claim to sovereignty in disguise, see JWC van Rossem,  ‘ Th e Autonomy of 
the EU: More is Less ? ’ in Wessel and Blockmans (n 49) 13, 25 – 17. 
  120  Art 4(3) TEU. 
close off  EU law at will, disallowing not only any external interference from inter-
national law into the EU legal order, but also denying subjection to the internal 
value-related constraints imposed by (EU) fundamental rights themselves. 
 Autonomy in Opinion 2/13 is  ‘ objectivised ’, representing the  ‘ sovereignitisa-
tion ’ of the Union and its legal order; 119 becoming a (substantive) principle of its 
own, but without any axiological anchor. Th e consequences of this abstraction 
have become all too visible in subsequent case law. 
 D. Th e Legacy of Non-accession to the ECHR: 
Venerating Autonomy as Such 
 One may think that Opinion 2/13 was peculiar to the specifi c, thorny question 
submitted to the Court, which would entail a complete redesign of the institu-
tional and constitutional framework of the EU legal order, by opening the system 
to external scrutiny by a non-EU body, thus (potentially) challenging the auto-
nomy of the regime and the ultimate authority of the CJEU within it  – though 
the Member States did not appear to share such perception when inserting 
 Article 6(2) TEU into the Lisbon Treaty. It was certainly plausible to expect that 
there would have been no refl ection in subsequent case law of the re- confi guration 
of the place and eff ect of fundamental rights within the system of sources of EU 
law. Th is, however, has not been the case. Th ere has been a wave of decisions that 
consolidate the exclusionary trend. 
 Aft er Opinion 2/13, a (hollow) suprematised  ‘ autonomy ’ of EU law has become 
an  end in and of itself, to be cherished and pursued for its own sake. It is no longer 
the procedural rule allowing EU law to perform its functions and achieve its aims; 
nor is it a mere empirical descriptor of the system, part of the legal tapestry of inte-
gration. Autonomy thereaft er is directly based on a reciprocal belief in the  fi ction 
of compliance with common standards across Member State jurisdictions, regard-
less of  actual observance of fundamental rights on the ground. Th e inadequacy of 
replacing  real compliance with  erga omnes obligations (creating individual rights), 
with an inter-State  presumption designed to accelerate expulsions and deporta-
tions (regardless of those same rights) has been neglected by the Court. Instead, 
autonomy has been mobilised to prevent appeals to reality beyond that assumed 
by the EU  acquis  – as interpreted by the Court  – with the principle of loyal coop-
eration forcing Member States into compliance. 120 
 Th is version of mutual confi dence, as defi ned in Opinion 2/13, is not only 
independent from eff ective realities, but also shapes and constrains the content 
and extent of fundamental rights, which can thenceforth only be interpreted and 
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  121  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) paras 177 and 170. 
  122  Concurring: Ziegler (n 22) and  D  Kochenov ,  ‘ EU Law without the Rule of Law :  Is the Veneration 
of Autonomy Worth It ? ’ ( 2015 )  34  Yearbook of European Law  74 . 
  123  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) paras 158 and 183. 
  124  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 193. Concurring: Ziegler (n 22). Th is is not to deny that via Art 351 
TFEU the Court has, at times, protected some Member State agreements vis- à -vis EU law. See 
eg  J  Klabbers ,  Th e European Union in International Law ( Pedone ,  2012 )  60 – 67 ;  cf  P  Koutrakos , 
 EU International Relations Law ,  2nd edn ( Hart Publishing ,  2015 )  324 – 41 . But the exception does not 
invalidate the rule. 
  125  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 172. 
  126  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 174. 
  127  Van Gend en Loos (n 3) 12. 
  128  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 194. 
  129  Opinion 2/13 (n 23) para 180. 
  130  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ( ‘ CRPD ’ ) [2006] 2515  UNTS 3. 
applied  ‘ in accordance with the constitutional framework [of the EU] ’ and on 
account of its  sui generis  ‘ structure and objectives ’. 121 Th e cart has been put before 
the horses. EU objectives are no longer subservient to, and achievable within 
the margins of, compliance with fundamental rights  – as checks on the possible 
excesses of power. Th e reverse is now true. Fundamental rights have instead been 
put at the service of Treaty goals; taken down the apex of the hierarchy of EU 
sources and substituted with a canon of near-blind trust in Member State perfor-
mance. Instead of providing a normative  basis , they have become a  means of 
integration like any other, a  tool within the body of the  acquis , subjected to the 
imperatives (and whims) of constitutionalisation. If taken to its logical exhaustion, 
the reasoning leads to the justifi cation of a  ‘ market bias ’ in the realisation of EU 
fundamental rights, mediated (and limited) by the notion of autonomy. 122 
 Autonomy appears to have subsumed the  ‘ new kind of legal order ’ of the EU 
in its entirety, 123 like an untold mystical source that translates the  ‘ intrinsic nature ’ 
of the Union  – as per the interpretation of its exclusive oracle, the Court  – making 
the whole of EU law sacrosanct. 124 As symbolic shorthand for (a specifi c collec-
tion of) EU objectives and structures, it incarnates  ‘ the process of integration 
that is the  raison d ’ ê tre of the EU itself  ’, 125 and must  as such , therefore, be revered 
and  ‘ preserved ’ 126  – presumably even above and beyond the actual rights of the 
individuals for the benefi t of whom integration is said to be enacted. 127 Th e main 
preoccupation is to protect (this elevated version of)  ‘ the underlying balance of 
the EU ’ and off set any threats that may  ‘ undermine the autonomy of EU law ’. 128 
Under this optic, fundamental rights are no longer the vehicle or inspiration of 
integration, but a potential obstacle to overcome when mutual trust and autonomy 
so demand. 
 Against this background, international human rights treaties  – just as the 
ECHR in Opinion 2/13  – rather than recognised intrinsic value, as suppliers 
of general principles, Article 2 TEU foundations, or content-fi llers of Charter 
entitlements, have been treated  ‘ like any other international agreement ’. 129 Th e 
approach to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 130 which 
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  131  Geneva Convention (n 88). 
  132  A similar approach has been followed in relation to the Aarhus Convention on Access to Informa-
tion, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters [1998] 
2161  UNTS 447, and investment treaties to which the EU is party, reaffi  rming (either explicitly or 
 de facto ) the autonomy of EU law against individual rights clauses therein. See Joined Cases 401/12 and 
403/12 P  Vereniging Milieudefensie ECLI:EU:C:2015:4; Joined Cases C-404/12 P and C-405 P  Natuur 
en Milieu ECLI:EU:C:2015:5 and Case C-284/16  Achmea ECLI:EU:C:2018:158. For critical accounts 
see, respectively,  S  G á sp á r-Szil á gyi ,  ‘ Th e Relationship between EU Law and International Agreements : 
 Restricting the Application of the Fediol and Nakajima Exceptions in  Vereniging Milieudefensie ’ ( 2015 ) 
 52  Common Market Law Review  1059 and A Dimopoulos,  ‘ Achmea : Th e Principle of Autonomy and 
its Implications for Intra and Extra-EU BITs ’ ( EJILTalk! , 27 March 2018)  www.ejiltalk.org/author/
adimopoulos/ . 
  133  Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11  HK Danmark ECLI:EU:C:2013:222. 
  134  C-356/12  Glatzel ECLI:EU:C:2014:350. 
  135  Case C-363/12  Z ECLI:EU:C:2014:159 para 72. 
  136  Case C-354/13  FOA ECLI:EU:C:2014:2463. 
  137  Z (n 135) paras 73, 75 and 76 (emphasis added). 
  138  Art 1 CRPD. 
the Union has ratifi ed, and to the Convention on the Status of Refugees, 131 directly 
incorporated in the body of the Treaties, off er particularly telling examples of this 
approach. 132 
 Th e line of cases regarding the former, including  HK Danmark 133 and 
 G latzel , 134 culminated on 18 March 2014 in  Z , a Grand Chamber judgment 
treating the Convention as any other  ‘ international agreement concluded by the 
European Union ’ (on whatever subject). 135 Th e reasoning was later repeated in 
 FOA , delivered on the same date as Opinion 2/13. 136 
 In  Z , the Court concluded that, since ratifi cation by the EU, the Disability 
Convention must be considered to have become  ‘ an integral part of the European 
Union legal order ’ and, therefore,  ‘ capable of being relied on for the purposes of 
 interpreting Directive 2000/78 [on equal treatment in employment] ’, especially for 
the purposes of defi ning the concept of  ‘ disability ’ contained therein  – which is 
not defi ned in EU law. 137 Th e interpretative function of the Convention is thus 
accepted. But, when it comes to establishing whether the Convention can be 
relied upon to challenge the  validity of the Directive, rather than  ‘ Europeanis-
ing ’ the international disability rights it enshrines as part of the EU fundamental 
rights  acquis (through the medium of Charter provisions, the general principles 
doctrine, or via direct application), the Court assimilates the instrument to the 
general category of international agreements and, rather than embracing the 
 ‘ direct absorption ’ or embeddedness approach seen in past case law in relation 
to other international human rights norms, it relies on the  Intertanko and  ATAA 
criteria to establish whether it may produce direct eff ect. 
 Surprisingly, the conclusion reached by the Court is that the provisions of the 
Convention  – in spite of the instrument explicitly seeking to  ‘ promote, protect 
and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their inher-
ent dignity ’, 138 that is, aiming at the creation of an individual right to equality, 
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  139  Z (n 135) para 90. 
  140  Z (n 135) para 88. 
  141  cf the very deferential approach of the CJEU towards privileged applicants under Art 263 TFEU, 
allowing them to rely on the Convention for Biological Diversity (presumably equally programmatic in 
substance) to review the legality of secondary law, even if the agreement was said not to produce direct 
eff ect, for it did not create subjective rights on private parties, in the  Biotech case (n 64). 
  142  Art 26 VCLT. Regarding the applicability of the  pacta sunt servanda maxim to international 
organisations, the ICJ has famously held that, as subjects of international law, they  ‘ are bound by any 
obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions, 
or under any international agreements to which they are parties ’. See  Interpretation of the Agreement of 
25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion) [1980] ICJ Rep 73, 89 – 90. 
  143  Th e absurdity of this position is illustrated by the Aarhus Convention litigation (n 132), wherein 
the CJEU rejects that Art 9(3), enshrining an access to justice provision within the Convention, 
entailing the obligation to remove any obstacles thereto  –  ‘ are not, as regards 
their content  … unconditional and suffi  ciently precise within the meaning 
of [ I ntertanko and  ATAA ] ’ to produce direct eff ect. Th erefore,  ‘ the validity of 
 Directive 2000/78 [on equal treatment in employment] cannot be assessed in the 
light of the Convention ’. 139 
 Th ere is no article-by-article assessment or any detailed analysis of the 
concrete content of the Convention to buttress this fi nding. Th e only support the 
Court adduces to sustain its claim is that,  ‘ in so far as the obligations imposed by that 
Convention are addressed to Contracting Parties ’, in the sense that it is Contract-
ing Parties that bear the responsibility of adopting  ‘ all appropriate  … measures for 
the implementation of the rights recognised in that Convention ’   – as it happens 
with essentially every Treaty, since individuals have no treaty-making powers of 
their own under international law and no independent capacity to implement 
international commitments  – the international agreement shall be considered 
 ‘ programmatic ’. 140 Th e  non sequitur nature of this logic is ignored by the Court. 141 
It is not that an international instrument be concluded and addressed to States 
(and the Union, in this case) as Contracting Parties that renders it programmatic. 
And what  ‘ programmatic ’ actually means remains equally obscure. Th e Court 
relies on the general implementation clause of the Convention, in Article 4(1)(a) 
thereof, to deny invocability. Should the specifi cation that  ‘ States Parties [are 
subject to] adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures 
for the implementation of the rights recognised in the  … Convention ’ have been 
absent from the text, the Court would have been at pains to sustain its reason-
ing. Th e specifi cation does no more than translate the general  pacta sunt servanda 
principle to the Convention ’ s terrain, according to which  ‘ every treaty in force 
[programmatic or not] is binding upon the parties to it [including the Union and 
 all its institutions] and  must be performed by them in good faith ’ 142 –  including 
through the means expressly enumerated in Article 4(1)(a). In a sense, all 
international commitments  – including those considered to be self-executing 
and/or conferring individual (human) rights  – require practical observance and 
a form of real implementation on the ground to be eff ective. So, if taken to its 
ultimate conclusion, reliance on this point would virtually amount to a wholesale 
denial of invocability of  all international law due to its  ‘ programmatic ’ nature. 143 
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be   suffi  ciently clear and unconditional to produce direct eff ect and substantiate the review of EU 
action. Further on the collision course the Court has placed the EU in relation to its international 
obligations, as interpreted by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, see M é ndez (n 55). 
  144  Case C-481/13  Qurbani ECLI:EU:C:2014:2101. 
  145  P  Eeckhout ,  ‘ Human Rights and the Autonomy of EU Law :  Pluralism or Integration ? ’ ( 2013 )  66 
 Current Legal Problems  169 (see further below). 
  146  H  Battjes ,  European Asylum Law and International Law ( Martinus Nijhoff  ,  2006 )  101 . 
  147  For a full theorisation, see  V  Moreno-Lax ,  Accessing Asylum in Europe ( Oxford University Press , 
 2017 ) Ch 7. 
  148  Art 18 CFR. In this connection, the CJEU has established, in  Abdulla , that  ‘ [u]nder Article 13 of 
the [Qualifi cation] Directive, the Member State is  required to grant refugee status to the applicant if 
he qualifi es  … ’ (emphasis added). See Joined Cases C-175, 176, 178 and 179/08  Abdulla [2010] ECR 
I-1493 para 62. Th e same applies, as per  M ’ Bodj , with regard to Art 18 of the Qualifi cation Directive 
(n 149), according to which  ‘ Member States  are to grant that status to a third country national eligible 
for subsidiary protection ’ (emphasis added). See Case C-542/13  M ’ Bodj ECLI:EU:C:2014:2452 para 29. 
  149  See Common Recital 3 of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualifi cation of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as benefi ciaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted [2011] OJ L337/9 
( ‘ Q ualifi cation Directive ’ ); Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection [2013] 
OJ L180/60 ( ‘ Asylum Procedures Directive ’ ); Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international 
protection [2013] OJ L180/96 ( ‘ Reception Conditions Directive ’ ); and Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 
of the  European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mecha-
nisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person [2013] 
OJ L180/31 ( ‘ Dublin III Regulation ’ ). 
 Th e same dismissive approach towards international human rights law treaties 
has been adopted vis- à -vis the 1951 Refugee Convention in the inadmissibility 
decision of the  Qurbani case, prolonging the shift  of Opinion 2/13. 144 
 Up to  Qurbani , the 1951 Refugee Convention had been considered an 
example of the  ‘ integration/embeddedness approach ’ to human rights. 145 Th e 
instrument is mentioned in a Treaty provision, Article 78 TFEU, requiring the 
Union to adopt a common asylum policy  ‘ ensuring compliance with the principle 
of  non- refoulement ’ and in full  ‘ accordance with the [1951] Geneva Convention ’. 
Th e Convention has thus been described as a  ‘ direct standard of decision ’, 146 
compliance with which is required  as a matter of EU law . 147 Th is has meant 
that, in interpreting the common asylum  acquis and in establishing its legality, 
the CJEU has taken the Refugee Convention as a main reference point and as a 
direct source of EU fundamental rights, mandating the Union and the Member 
States, when acting within the scope of EU law, to make sure  ‘ the right to asylum 
[is] guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention ’. 148 Th e 
Convention acts as a minimum fl oor of protection in refugee matters  – akin to the 
function assumed by the ECHR within EU law at large under Article 52(3) CFR. 
Th e instrument has indeed been acknowledged to constitute  ‘ the cornerstone of 
the international legal regime for the protection of refugees ’, to which  all pream-
bles of  all legislative acts adopted by the Union in the fi eld of asylum law explicitly 
refer. 149 What is more, legislation forming the Common European Asylum System 
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  150  Qualifi cation Directive (n 149). For analysis, see  S  Peers ,  V  Moreno-Lax ,  M  Garlick , and  E  Guild , 
 EU Immigration and Asylum Law ,  2nd edn ( Brill ,  2015 ) Vol 3, 65. 
  151  See, eg,  Abdulla (n 148) paras 51 – 53; Case C-31/09  Bolbol [2010] ECR I-5539 paras 36 – 38 and 
Joined Cases C-57 and 101/09  B and D [2010] ECR I- 979 paras 76 – 78 (emphasis added). 
  152  Qurbani (n 144) para 22. 
  153  Qurbani (n 144) para 21. 
  154  Qurbani (n 144) para 24. 
  155  Qurbani (n 144) para 25. 
  156  Qurbani (n 144) para 25. 
  157  Referring especially to Arts 3(b), 4, and 14(1), Union Code on the rules governing the movement 
of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) [2016] OJ L77/1. For a thorough account, see 
Moreno-Lax (n 147) Part II. 
  158  Dublin III Regulation (n 149). 
  159  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals [2008] OJ L348/98 ( ‘ Returns Directive ’ ). 
(CEAS), especially the Qualifi cation Directive, 150 is deemed to have been  ‘ adopted 
to guide the competent authorities  … in the application of that Convention ’, for 
which reason, the Directive  ‘ must  … be interpreted in the light of its general 
scheme and purpose, while respecting the [Refugee] Convention  … ’ 151  – a caveat 
absent from case law regarding other international treaties. So, up until  Qurbani , 
the 1951 Convention was the ECHR equivalent (prior to Opinion 2/3) within the 
EU asylum system. 
 But just like Opinion 2/13 upsets the standing of the ECHR within the EU 
legal order, so does  Qurbani in relation to the asylum  acquis . Th e decision revisits 
the entire set-up and turns it upside down, assimilating the Refugee Conven-
tion to the  ‘ normal ’ range of  ‘ international agreements ’, which, if  ‘ concluded ’ 
by the EU, would  ‘ form an integral part of its legal order ’. 152 Because this is not 
the case  – and due to the inadequate way in which the questions from the refer-
ring court had been worded, omitting any clear connection between Article 31 
of the Convention, on the non-penalisation of refugees for their illegal entry 
into a country of asylum, and the EU rules on the admissibility of applications 
and border  procedures  – the Court declares to lack jurisdiction to interpret 
the Convention  as such . Th e power of the CJEU  ‘ extends only to rules which are 
part of EU law ’, the Court rightly asserts. 153 
 Th is is in spite of past jurisprudence and other key factors acknowledged by 
the Court itself  – including many of the above: that several pieces of EU legislation 
have been adopted in the fi eld to which the Convention applies, 154 that Article 78 
TFEU provides that the common policy on asylum must be in accordance with 
the Convention, 155 and that Article 18 of the Charter makes clear that the right 
to asylum is to be guaranteed with due respect for the Convention. 156 Th e wider 
links to the Schengen  acquis , establishing the rules applicable to admission in the 
Schengen area (as well as the relevant asylum-based exceptions), 157 the Dublin 
implications of such  non liquet conclusion, 158 and the possible infl uence of, and 
on, the Returns Directive, 159 are all disregarded. 
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  160  Qurbani (n 144) para 27. 
  161  Qurbani (n 144) para 26. 
  162  Case C-31/09  Bolbol ECLI:EU:C:2010:351 and Case C-364/11  El Kott ECLI:EU:C:2012:826. 
  163  Qurbani (n 144) para 28. 
  164  M ’ Bodj (n 148) and Case C-562/13  Abdida ECLI:EU:C:2014:2453. 
  165  Case C-472/13  Shepherd ECLI:EU:C:2015:117. 
  166  See further, V Moreno-Lax,  ‘ Paradise Lost  – From  Elgafaji to  Qurbani : Towards the Hyper- 
Autonomy of the Common European Asylum System ? ’ (in progress). 
 Th e Court adopts a very formalistic approach to disclaim jurisdiction. It 
is bizarre how it discounts the importance of Article 14(6) of the Qualifi cation 
Directive, which expressly refers to Article 31 of the Geneva Convention  – as the 
Court itself notes. 160 Th e need to ensure the eff ectiveness and uniformity in the 
interpretation and application of EU asylum law are not enough to convince 
the judges, 161 notwithstanding the diametrically opposed position they adopted 
in analogous judgments. As the Court acknowledges, in  Bolbol and  El Kott , 162 
on Palestinian refugees, Luxembourg  ‘ did indeed accept that it had jurisdiction 
to interpret the provisions of the Geneva Convention to which EU law made 
a  renvoi ’. 163 
 Accepting that matters of formulation may rightly lead to a request for a prelimi-
nary ruling to be rejected, what is most worrisome is not the rejection per se, 
but the reasoning the CJEU (unnecessarily) deploys to substantiate its dismissal  – 
as if preparing the ground for Opinion 2/13 and its aft ermath  – undermining 
the rank and signifi cance of the Refugee Convention within the CEAS. 
 Qurbani could have been an unfortunate one-off  case. Yet, its eff ects continue 
to be felt today. On the same day as Opinion 2/13, the Grand Chamber adopted 
two controversial decisions in defi ance of international standards, isolating the 
CEAS, and lowering the level of EU asylum protection with regard to two seri-
ously ill subsidiary protection claimants. 164 And in February 2015, in  Shepherd , 
the Court unduly narrowed down the scope of the defi nition of  ‘ persecution ’, rely-
ing on a purely self-referential (and purportedly  contra legem ) interpretation of 
Article 9 of the Qualifi cation Directive, in disregard of global trends and UNHCR 
materials on refugee status of conscientious objectors opposing military service. 165 
Th e self-referential, close-circuit approach to the interpretation of CEAS instru-
ments that the Court has continued to pursue thereaft er, relying pre-eminently on 
(a very textual reading of) secondary law, bear witness to the long-lasting legacy 
of Opinion 2/13. 166 
 III. Internal, External and Axiological Autonomy: 
Rule of Law-less Emancipation 
 Before Lisbon and Opinion 2/13,  ‘ substantive borrowing ’ was the technique 
of penetration of international human rights law into EU law preferred by the 
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Court. Th e method was also employed, for instance, as regards norms of general 
 international law on matters not regulated by (and arguably laying beyond the 
scope of) EU law, eg rules on the delimitation of State jurisdiction. 167 Th ese were 
adopted and applied quasi-automatically  – sometimes  qua general principles of 
EU law 168  – without the Court analysing whether direct or indirect eff ect was 
possible or appropriate. At that point, (international/constitutional) human rights 
were  ‘ Europeanised ’ as  ‘ fundamental rights ’ and internalised or  ‘ embedded ’ in the 
rest of the EU legal framework. 169 
 Up to the adoption of the Charter, the EU lacked its own catalogue of rights. 
Instead, the CJEU  ‘ transformed ’ international (and Member State constitu-
tional) standards into internal EU law, borrowing from instruments, which 
were not formally binding on the Union. It was in  Internationale Handelsgesells-
chaft  where it was fi rst established that  ‘ respect for fundamental rights [as such 
and without further caveats] forms  an integral part of the general principles of 
[EU] law protected by the Court of Justice ’, not necessitating an offi  cial act of 
 incorporation. 170 And, as general principles, unlike treaty law or international 
custom, fundamental rights were raised to the (highest) category of primary law. 
Th is was subsequently codifi ed in Article 6(3) TEU and elevated to the status of 
 ‘ founding values ’ of the Union in Article 2 TEU. 
 ‘ [I]nternational treaties for the protection of human rights on which the 
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories ’ were considered 
key sources of  ‘ inspiration ’ from which general principles were drawn. In partic-
ular, they supplied  ‘ guidelines which should be followed within the framework 
of [EU] law ’. 171 Again, although not formally binding on the Union, the ECHR 
was recognised to bear  ‘ particular signifi cance ’ in this context. 172 But there are 
other examples: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 173 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 174 as well as the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 175 among other instruments, were also 
taken into account. 
  167  Kramer (n 54) paras 30 – 33;  Ahlstr ö m (n 54) para 18;  ATAA (n 54) para 114 ff . 
  168  See, for instance,  Racke (n 15) para 49 ( pacta sunt servanda ). See also  Joint Cases C-120/06 P and 
C-121/06 P  FIAMM and Fedon [ 2008 ]  ECR I-6513 para 92 and  Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01 
 Commission v Germany [ 2003 ]  ECR I-3609 para 24. 
  169  Eeckhout (n 145). 
  170  Case 11/70  Internationale Handelsgesellschaft  [ 1970 ]  ECR 1125 para 4 (emphasis added). 
  171  Case 4/73  Nold [ 1974 ]  ECR 491 para 13. 
  172  Hoechst (n 109) para 13;  Case C-260/89  ERT [ 1991 ]  ECR I-2925 para 41;  Case C-299/95  Kremzow 
[ 1997 ]  ECR I-2629 para 14;  Case C-274/99 P  Connolly [ 2001 ]  ECR I-1611 para 37;  Case C-94/00 
 Roquette Fr è res [ 2002 ]  ECR I-9011 para 25. 
  173  Case C-135/08  Rottmann [ 2010 ]  ECR I-1449 para 53, referring to the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, UNGA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810, 71 (1948). 
  174  Case C-244/06  Dynamic Medien [ 2008 ]  ECR I-505 para 39 ff ;  Case C-540/03  Parliament v Council 
[ 2006 ]  ECR I-5769 para 37, referring to the ICCPR (n 87). 
  175  Case C-73/08  Bressol [ 2010 ]  ECR I-2735 para 85 ff , referring to the International Covenant on 
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 Fundamental rights  qua general principles were set to fulfi l a dual function, 
providing a means of interpretation and a standard of validity and review of 
EU rules. 176 One could argue that these were (and are),  prima facie , the same 
functions (potentially) performed by other international law sources. Th e diff er-
ence, though, is that human rights are fi rst internalised and operate from within, 
 as a matter of EU law . Any incompatibility of an act of the Union with human/
fundamental rights becomes thus one of internal inconsistency with the own 
constitutional values of the organisation. 
 Nevertheless, since the entry into force of the Charter, the relationship with 
international human rights law instruments has progressively been rarefi ed. 
Notwithstanding the  ‘ bridges ’ to the ECHR in Article 52(3) CFR and to other 
relevant treaties in Article 53 CFR, 177 the  ‘ internal ’ catalogue of EU fundamen-
tal rights has displaced the  ‘ external ’ listings enshrined in parallel international 
human rights covenants, with the Court fostering a solipsistic reading of Charter 
rights  – especially aft er Opinion 2/13, as elaborated above. Yet, there is no good 
reason for such a stance. Th e substance of Charter rights, as already stated, origi-
nates in common human rights obligations of the Member States, stemming from 
the shared constitutional traditions and joint international commitments the 
Charter  ‘ reaffi  rms ’, 178 and which  continue to penetrate the EU legal order as both 
general principles and founding values of the organisation, even aft er the CFR 
codifi cation. 179 
 Th is is why the Opinion 2/13 paradigm can only be understood to represent an 
unwarranted emancipation of the EU legal order not only from external referents 
of human rights protection, but also from its own internal fundamental rights 
core. Th e form of  a -axiological autonomy it propounds has drained the Union 
system of the substantive stratum pertaining to the Rule of Law. 180 Kochenov 
explains this well. 181 He enlists the  jurisdictio-gubernaculum binomial to desig-
nate the two main components of the principle. While  gubernaculum represents 
the  legality of the  acquis of rules made in accordance with pre-established legal 
procedures,  jurisdictio denotes  ‘ the law above the law ’ to which the rulers are 
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subject (and that  ‘ made them king ’ 182 ). It is the compendium of value-related 
standards from which legality derives its  legitimacy  – the  ‘ spiritual heart ’, in Allott ’ s 
words, of the legal system; inimical to the untrammelled exercise of power. 183 
Th e two elements taken together encapsulate the duality of the law at the centre of 
the Rule of Law ideal. 184 
 Th e neglect of  jurisdictio , through a notion of autonomy that embraces only 
the legality component, constitutes an impoverished vision of the Rule of Law. 
It confounds the Rule of Law with the mere lawfulness of rules, whatever their 
axiological justifi cation  – it takes over the ideal of Justice inscribed in the Rule 
of Law absorbing its normativity away. 185 What is more, in Opinion 2/13 the 
idea of  jurisdictio reining in  gubernaculum is simply not tolerated. 186 In fact, 
the  EU Rule of Law it profi les has been reduced to mean that  gubernaculum 
(or  ‘ autonomy ’ ) reigns supreme. Hailing legality over legitimacy in this way 
pre-empts any  j urisdictio -based questioning from within, making any challenge 
of the  acquis well-nigh impossible. Apparently, this (autopoietic version postu-
lated by the Court of the  EU ) Rule of Law is precisely mobilised to deactivate 
contestation. 187 
 Yet, authority  – including that of the Court  – should remain bound by 
 jurisdictio outside its own control  – in order to prevent miscarriages of justice. 188 No 
system governed by the Rule of Law can free itself from human (or  fundamental) 
rights as ultimate demarcation between the legitimate use and abuse of power. 189 
Th e opposite makes the autonomous system of the EU emerge as a formally 
coherent legal order, bound by nothing else than the day-to-day norms of its own 
creation, with no higher aspiration beyond being shielded from external infl uence. 
To achieve this aim,  human rights are fi rst abstractly exscinded from their  funda-
mental rights counterparts and then externalised  – made into exogenous rules 
outside the internal legal order and rejected as extraneous means of validation. 
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 Th e idea of autonomy the CJEU embraces is a remarkably reductionist 
notion, exclusively focused on negative protections from external (and external-
ised) restraint. It views it as pure self-determinism and unmolested self-action, 
suggesting the Union legal order should be considered autonomous  ‘ for its own 
sake ’. Th e Court fails to acknowledge the fallacy of complete independence   – 
especially in an  ‘ ever closer Union ’ precisely based on  ‘ the  universal values of 
the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, 
equality and the rule of law ’. 190 A self-determined choice to cooperate with others 
or to comply with outside standards that become internalised within the system 
does not amount to non-autonomy. 
 Autonomy does not need to involve splendid isolation by treating self-
determinism as an entirely internal self-referential process. It may actually involve 
a reduction of independence or a decision to become dependent in certain 
situations. Autonomy is relational  – predicated vis- à -vis  another system, rule or 
entity. Co-legislation and co-validation through shared ideals, if freely self-imposed, 
constitutes as much an expression of autonomous will as the embracement of the 
purest form of autarky. 
 Willk ü r  – in the Kantian sense  – provides an escape from zero-sum games and 
a perception of autonomy in absolutising  ‘ either/or ’ terms, refocusing attention 
on issues of legitimacy and the expression of common values refl ective of mutual 
public reason. Autonomy in this light is not limited to its negative dimension, 
as solely meaning  ‘ free from ’ dependence and  ‘ exclusive of  ’ external infl uence. 
It rather connotes a  volont é distincte ; a form of self-determinism, ensuring the 
capacity for autonomous choice in a system of joint production of rules and 
values. Th e ensuing normative principles of Dignity, Justice and intrinsic human 
worth are thereby co-generated as  ‘ autonomous ’ standards, imposing common 
(external/internalised) constraints that are universally valid and restrict the free-
dom of everyone within the system (both the rulers and the ruled). 191 Th ose 
standards provide the  jurisdictio , the moral justifi cation, to the  gubernaculum 
originating in institutional conduct  – whether of the Court or somebody else. 
 IV. Conclusion:  ‘ Like Ships in the Night ’ 
 Th e construal of autonomy  qua autarky as a matter of course, as Luxembourg does 
in Opinion 2/13 and its sequels, is not tenable. Th ere is no  a priori determinism 
of what autonomy entails. And this is exemplifi ed by the very evolution of the 
term in the Court ’ s own case law that the foregoing sections have analysed  – fi rst, 
(implicitly) taking autonomy as a functional consequence of the Union being 
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constituted as an (independent) actor of international law; then, as a mecha-
nism of emancipation from the Member States and as a tool to claim primacy 
and direct eff ect within their legal systems; later still, as a vehicle of constitution-
alisation vis- à -vis international law (to preserve fundamental rights); to fi nally 
become detached from the EU founding values (to protect the entire legal order, 
and particularly the CJEU ’ s jurisdiction within it, from any possible interference). 
 Autonomy should simply be the  ‘ door ’ to the external world  – the line of 
communication between orders, rules and values. Whether the door is then kept 
open or closed is a diff erent issue. Th ere is no necessary implication for autonomy 
to mean isolation. Reading into autonomy a predetermined substantive choice 
of insularity is not warranted. Th e decision is not fi xed by autonomy itself. Th e 
notion does not automatically demand that  ‘ the [EU] legal order and the inter-
national legal order pass by each other like ships in the night ’. 192 Internationalism 
and constitutionalisation are not mutually exclusive by defi nition, especially when 
it comes to human/fundamental rights. 193 
 Th e decision to open or close the system can well be based on  gubernaculum 
alone. But then the system as a whole requires  jurisdictio to keep the power behind 
such decision in check and for compliance with its ultimate source of validation. 
External/internalised constraints are an essential feature of governance by law. 194 
 Th e conversion of EU law into an autonomous island risks becoming 
self-destructive. Th erein the Rule of Law becomes contingent and human/
fundamental rights relative and alienable; left  at the mercy of the naked author-
ity of the  Luxembourg Court. 195 Th e CJEU judges should, therefore, revisit 
their approach  – the principle of loyalty (or  ‘ mutual trust ’ ) applies to them too, 
enjoining them to engage in  ‘ sincere cooperation ’ to assist the Union and its legal 
order  ‘ in carrying out tasks which fl ow from the Treaties ’. 196 Th e Treaties ’ choice 
to embed (universal) rights into EU law binds the Court and must inform its 
(re-)interpretation. 197 Autonomy  qua axiological emancipation from the very 
values of a  ‘ community based on the rule of law ’ 198 is unsustainable. It amounts 
to  denying  ‘ the ultimate purpose of all law ’. 199 
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